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Abstract—The study examines the relationship between the 
board of directors’ gender diversity and tax aggressiveness of 
banks listed on the Nigerian Stock Exchange (NSE). Using cross 
sectional time-series research design as the blue print for data 
collection in this study, data collected were analysed using 
Statistical Package for Social Sciences (SPSS) 21. The study 
provides evidence that a positive and non-significant association 
exist between female directors and tax aggressiveness after 
controlling for firm characteristics and governance mechanisms. 
In addition, the interaction of board size with female directors is 
significantly associated with the reduced level of tax 
aggressiveness. The results are consistent with the ‘women risk 
aversion’ theory which stipulates that the different attitude of 
females to excessive risks can project upon corporate policies and 
decisions. However, the low representation of women in executive 
positions and on the board limits how their influence is perceived. 
The study also made some recommendations amongst which 
include that banks should be encouraged, or otherwise mandated 
to appoint women as board members to take advantage of their 
expected benefits.   
Keywords— Tax aggressiveness, female directors, board size, 
board gender diversity, risk averse 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The board of directors is widely known to ensure the 
credibility of the financial reporting process and quality 
information for the computation of tax liability which is highly 
significant to public revenue and national development. Even 
with this, income taxes are seen as major source of cash 
outflow and significant amount of time, energy, and money 
may be employed reducing its impact on financial results. 
Thus, the decisions of managers and tax accountants may 
possibly favour incorporating actions that decrease taxes [30]. 
Therefore, tax aggressiveness refers to the aggressive side of 
tax avoidance practices [21]. Given the oversight role of the 
board on executive decisions, they may impact on tax reducing 
activities and should be considered as a key factor in the 
success or termination of aggressive tax behavior [39]. 
While much attention has been placed on the effects of 
board features on firm outcomes, prior theoretical and 
empirical research have neglected the relevance of diversity in 
attributes of board members. The board competence is likely to 
depend as much on the board attributes as on expertise, skills 
and demographic qualities of the directors in terms of age, 
nationality, experience, ethnicity amongst others, however, 
there is a growing interest on gender diversity in recent 
literature [6, 32]. Female board participation connotes when at 
least one female director exists on the board. Various 
suggestions advocate less risky policies and outcomes for 
female directors given that the higher risk avoidance behaviour 
of women compared to men could drive financial decisions and 
results.  
On this basis, this study posits that the ability of the board 
of directors to reduce the tax aggressive behaviour can be 
potentially increased when a female is present on the board. An 
alternative view on how gender diversity of the board 
influences tax behaviour suggests that female directors serve 
better in controlling and monitoring the actions and reports of 
management [45] [46] through better board attendance and 
greater monitoring by sitting on audit, nominating, and 
corporate governance committees which may limit the avenue 
to perform rent extraction. A substantial number of prior 
studies have examined whether women involvement within the 
board can lead to improved corporate governance and company 
results [33], risk portfolio [36], financial reporting [6], and 
company acquisitiveness [26]. However, there is a dearth of 
research addressing the influence of board gender diversity on 
the tax aggressive behaviour to reflect the extent of tax 
planning activities. This also opens an opportunity to assess 
gender diversity on bank board effects on tax planning since 
extensive research focused on firms in non-financial sectors. 
As the increased clamor for gender diversity resulted in 
greater female participation on the board of directors across 
countries [33], it is necessary and imperative to identify the 
benefits of women directors on corporate and financial 
decisions. Besides, no prior evidence exists on the link between 
bank female directors and tax aggressiveness in Nigeria. Based 
on this background, the purpose of the study is to examine the 
association between female board members and tax 
aggressiveness. Using listed Nigerian banks between 2012-
2014 periods, the empirical evidence revealed that the ratio of 
women the board, though positively related to effective tax 
rate, does not have a significant effect on tax aggressiveness. 
This result provide evidence that the female board members are 
not significant in reducing tax aggressiveness which may be 
attributed to the fact that few women on board may be 
inadequate to drive the expected gender benefits on tax 
avoidance policies. 
Contributing to literature in diverse ways, this study reports 
on an emerging research related to board gender diversity and 
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tax aggressiveness in emerging economies [3] [32]. This is 
necessary to consider whether prior findings can be observed in 
another environment different in respect of culture, tax policies 
and governance efficiency. The study is also important to tax 
policy makers since tax aggressiveness could possibly lead to 
tax evasion that is detrimental to a country’s revenue base and 
its public spending. The study also improves awareness of the 
users of financial statement and tax collection bodies on the 
extent of tax aggressiveness by which huge amounts may be 
lost [11]. The substantial reduction in the pre-tax earnings of 
firms which subsequently reduces their distributable profits 
may incline managerial actions towards tax aggressive 
behaviour on the basis of the regulatory 30% corporate tax.  
The planning of remaining sections of the research is seen 
as follows: section 2 provides an overview of prior literature 
and hypotheses developed on gender diversity and tax 
aggressiveness as well as the theoretical framework. Section 3 
indicates the methods, data and model specifications 
underlying the study while section 4 shows the empirical 
results and discussions. Section 5 concludes the paper with the 
contribution, recommendation and limitations. 
II. TAX  AGGRESSIVENESS  
Tax aggressive practices are usually implemented to 
minimise the tax burden to achieve greater after-tax earnings 
per share and cash available for shareholders [31]. Thus, it 
could also reflect a decline in taxable income when managed 
through tax planning practices that are legal as well as 
activities that may be viewed as illegal in some circumstances 
[13] [31] to reduce tax liability. Reference [28] [32] provide 
that tax aggressiveness can be substituted with tax avoidance, 
tax planning and tax sheltering. Since tax aggressiveness is a 
form of corporate decision and action that could reflect both 
executives and non-executives aversion to risk, it presents a 
suitable setting to assess gender differences in risk taking for 
board members [21].  
When making board decisions, paramount interest is shifted 
to the benefits and penalties linked with the engagement of 
avoidance practices. In other words, engaging in tax aggressive 
activities is accompanied by costs and benefits. The benefits 
cut across corporate tax efficiency resulting in larger cash 
retention for owners or shareholders as well as managerial 
rewards for obtaining compensations from owners and 
shareholders for their tax aggressive actions [13]. This 
indicates that higher net cash flow retained in form of direct tax 
savings is a major form of marginal gain which favours the 
shareholders. This is even more obvious in private family firms 
where the maintenance of public status and socio-emotional 
wealth are mostly seen as insignificant [42]. 
On the opposite side, the complexity and obscure nature of 
tax aggressiveness may promote activities that causes diversion 
of rent from shareholders such as earnings management, perk 
consumptions and excessive compensation to be concealed 
[13][28][42]. This is possible when the shareholders are unable 
to evaluate the managers’ performance as a result of unclear 
corporate structure from the adoption of elaborate tax planning 
schemes; this form of actions were prominent in the Enron 
scandal [18]. Here, the monitoring role of the board is very 
significant as managers may tend to over compensate in the 
event of huge cash savings. Tax aggressive firms may bear 
implementation costs, political costs, costs of defending 
aggressive tax positions [5] [37] and adverse public image [24]. 
Likewise, the reputation of the board members may also be 
smeared. 
Similarly, the survey of [22] also disclosed that in the 
process of determining the appropriate tax schemes, the 
opinions of the majority of tax executives were similar on the 
significance of its impact on the reputation of a company. A 
major detriment attributed to tax aggressive conduct is the 
possibility of imposition of tax fines or large penalties by the 
tax officials or regulatory bodies [43] [22] when found guilty. 
There may be loss of efficiency in internal control and potential 
stock price discount when the shareholders perceive that the 
purpose of tax aggressive actions of the firm is for rent 
extraction and when bad news that have been hoarded are 
exposed [5] [17]. 
Moreover, a large body of research focused on corporate 
governance mechanisms such as board of director features 
[30], form of ownership [13] [40], ownership structure [34] and 
tax aggressiveness have led to inconclusive results.  However, 
the strength of existing corporate governance may influence the 
final outcomes [24]. In comparison to other corporate offences,  
[24] observe a smaller, significant fall in stock price around the 
period of tax sheltering reports; but a smaller impact on stock 
price in high governance firms. Moreover, well-governed (or 
poorly governed) firms experience significantly higher (or 
reduced) abnormal stock returns before, during, and after the 
tax shelter activity [43].  
A firm’s ownership structure which affects the nature of the 
agency problems arising in corporate settings also influences 
the outcomes of tax aggressiveness [5] [13]. These findings 
suggest that not all shareholders want managers to engage in 
substantial tax avoidance activities. Reference [28] also 
observed that the incentives encouraging tax sheltering 
activities may vary across different groups of shareholders, 
including institutional shareholders with various investment 
horizons.  
III. GENDER DIVERSITY OF DIRECTORS 
The board is responsible for monitoring and evaluating 
management to act in the best interest of the shareholders 
through an effective corporate governance structure. To 
perform this task effectively, the directors should be adequately 
diverse to ostensibly mitigate the expropriation of firm 
resources for example by rent extraction. As [19] [39] indicate 
that the directors can influence a firm’s tax aggressive position, 
the presence of female directors creates an avenue to study the 
extent of tax aggressiveness. Therefore, female directors are 
governance mechanism that shows women represented on the 
board. 
Thus, there have been arguments that diversity could 
improve the effectiveness of the board and specifically 
recommends that companies can benefit from the existence of 
professional women in their boards. Higher participation of 
women on corporate board is generally promoted as women 
members are believed to bring important information and 
knowledge to the board due to more wide-ranging professional 
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experiences [9] [41]. Given that more alternatives are regarded, 
[32] [46] suggest that firms with diverse boards regarding 
gender embody innovation and quality process for 
deliberations to make board decisions. Thus, such firms 
encounter quality problem-solving, effective leadership; better 
understanding of the business market and benefits from global 
relationships [1] [11]. 
Reference [45] argued that the chance of gaining more 
profit and adding to shareholders’ value makes gender-diverse 
board more favoured which improves the image of the firm. 
Reference [32] also noted that board comprising of female 
directors are likely promote honesty and high ethical values, 
greater independent reasoning, more informed decisions that 
increase the level of transparency at the board level and  higher 
credibility within the board. However, some drawbacks of 
gender diverse boards suggest that reaching unanimous 
decisions may take longer periods and conflicts may arise more 
frequently. Reference [27] concludes that women risk aversion 
results in low financial performance in the stock market. 
Gender-based behavioural differences between women and 
men are exhibited and observed from the decisions made by 
directors which tend to impact the major strategic and financial 
decisions taken [36]. Women are also likely to more compliant 
with legal requirements and specifically interested in tax 
matters when present on the board [3] [4]. Linked to gender 
differences, the interpretations of tax regulations and tax 
compliance levels may be dependent on the masculine traits: 
dominance, competitiveness, aggressiveness and feminine 
characters such as kindness, value for life, risk avoidance [1] 
[21].  
Majority of previous studies have documented the positive 
influence of gender diversity on the corporate governance 
activities and firm performance in various contexts of 
developed countries [33] and developing countries [45]. 
Reference [6] [41] also suggest that women exercise intense 
monitoring over manager actions, have a higher attendance and 
hold more positions in monitoring committees such as the 
audit, nomination and compensation. Recent studies have also 
assessed the influence of female directors on environmental 
reporting and corporate social responsibility reporting [7]. 
IV. HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
Reference [11] [16] expressed that expansive research has 
dwelt on gender differences on attitudes toward risk and in 
risk-related behaviour from psychology and economics. 
Generally, it is believed that women are more risk averse than 
men [12] [14]. On the basis of risk attitude, gender differences 
in economic experiments have been reviewed in the survey of 
[14]. Moreover, the differences in the behaviour of women and 
men may have essential effects on corporate financial decisions 
and outcomes [36]. Providing support for more women in the 
labour market, the differences in risk attitudes of female 
professionals have also been established.  
In line with this, empirical literatures have found a negative 
association between the number of women on boards and bank 
risk. Reference [10] finds that, among other factors, gender 
diversity helped reduce ex-post risk for Italian banks. 
Reference [23] also shows that risk is negatively linked to 
women directors in OECD banks. Research reports that firms 
with women directors had lower portfolio risks in Italy [16].  
However, on the sample of listed firms in Sweden, [1] survey 
of directors provide evidence that female directors may be even 
more risk prone than their male counterparts. 
Given that women are generally more cautious and less 
motivated to bear excessive risks, the gender of the firm’s 
directors have been suggested to affect corporate polices and 
outcomes. Reference [6] [41] indicate that firms with female 
directors have lower absolute discretionary accruals (or 
earnings management). Reference [20] [27] document that 
female executives and directors are more conservative in 
financial reporting. Female executives are more cautious in 
making significant acquisitions and issuing debt [26]. 
Reference [36] provide robust evidence that banks led by 
female executive take more conservative policies and maintain 
higher levels of capital. Reference [16] shows that females on 
board positively impact on the quality of credit. They support 
the opinion of women being more inclined to monitor and 
control activities. 
In addition, empirical evidence relating to gender diversity 
among professionals in the workforce supports the negative 
relationship. Unlike male investors, [26] observed that more 
attention is given to downside risk by female professional 
investors. Reference [9] noted that female loan officers are 
more risk averse than the male officers and are likely to limit 
credit to newly established firms. Reference [8] also revealed 
that loan officers that are women better oversee their loan 
portfolio and have reduced chances of being unpaid and 
defaulted on these loans. 
Research in the accounting literature has addressed the link 
between board gender diversity and tax aggressiveness. On a 
sample 300 S & P 500 firms, [4] examined the effect of gender 
diversity on corporate tax planning for 1996- 2009. They 
observed no significant effect of board gender diversity on tax 
planning. This is in agreement with the notion that the low 
proportion of women directors and dominance of masculine 
strategies for tax planning impedes higher gender diverse 
influence on board decisions. Among other three measures of 
board attributes, [3] showed that the percentage of women on 
the board was positively and significantly related to tax 
planning for 32 listed Tunisian companies during 2000 to 2007. 
On the contrary, [2] found that there is a negative effect 
between board gender diversity and tax optimization. They 
concluded that the presence of women does not enhance the tax 
planning strategy within the firm but leads to further increases 
in effective tax rates. Between the periods of 1988 to 2007,  
[21] examined the executives’ gender effect on tax 
aggressiveness and compare the extent of tax aggressiveness 
between the different transition periods for male-to-female 
CFO turnover firms for most S & P 1500 companies. Using 
three measures of tax aggressiveness, female CFOs were 
related to lower tax aggressiveness than their male 
counterparts. Similar results were obtained for subsequent 
male-to-female CFO transition.   
Reference [11] noted significant evidence of a negative link 
between board gender diversity and tax aggressive actions 
using 39 Tunisian listed firms over the period of 2006–2012. 
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They concluded that the higher percentage of women increases 
the effective tax rate signifying low tax aggressiveness. 
Reference [44] also established that the percentage of female 
directors influences the tax aggressive activities on a sample of 
SBF 120 index French companies amongst other governance 
variables. On a sample of U.S firms over the period of 2006-
2009, [32] revealed that a negative and significant association 
exists between board gender diversity and tax aggressiveness. 
Similarly, it is expected that when more women are 
represented on the board, it is highly probable that monitoring 
and oversight function over managerial choices on tax liability 
improves to reflect on the decisions related to tax aggressive 
activities. Therefore, the paper proposes the following 
hypothesis that: 
Hypothesis 1: There is a positive relation between female 
directors and tax aggressiveness in Nigerian banks. 
On the other hand, the size of the board firm can be argued 
to be an essential moderator in the perspective of tax 
aggressive behaviour. The relative sizes of corporate boards 
can be a key factor for firms that exhibit tax aggressive 
tendencies [30] [44]. Small boards of firms may have greater 
incentives to engage in tax aggressiveness and they are likely 
to be smaller in size and face less public scrutiny. However, 
[35] provide evidence that the small boards of directors support 
the good tax management, while large boards are proving 
ineffectiveness because of the difficulties in decision-making 
about tax aggressiveness policy. 
In spite of this, extensive prior evidence shows that larger 
boards should perform better, efficiently discharge its functions 
and have more women represented on the board. As well, they 
should consist of a seasoned group of individuals with 
adequate knowledge and expertise to supervise firm activities.  
Hence, the strengthened position of the board from size and 
gender diversity of the board on managerial supervision should 
lead to reduce the motivation for aggressive tax policies by top 
executives. Therefore, 
Hypothesis 2: The association between female director and 
tax aggressiveness will be positively influenced by the relative 
board size. 
V. METHODS 
The choice of target sample for data collection consists of 
the 15 listed banking institutions on the Nigerian Stock 
Exchange because they are under the strict monitoring of the 
body and are highly regulated. This indicates the relative 
significance of the banking sector within the economy and 
prompts their preferred selection. Similar to [32] [34], banks 
with negative pre-tax income and tax credit were excluded to 
produce a reduced final sample of 11 banks. The data on the 
study variables was collected from the annual reports sourced 
from the company’s website and African financials website for 
the periods of 2012 to 2014 which was the latest and most 
complete financial period available for data collection at the 
time this study was carried out.  
There has been a number of measures of tax aggressiveness 
used in the prior literature and are usually centered on the 
financial statements estimates [5]. Several previous studies 
assess firms’ tax aggressiveness using the degree of their 
unrecognised tax benefits. Effective Tax Rates (ETR) which is 
a common proxy has the following measures: accounting or 
GAAP, current, cash and long-run cash ETR. It could also be 
measured as the income tax expense divided by operating cash 
flow; ratio of cash taxes paid by operating cash flow and ETR 
differential [25] [37].  
The dependent variable used, the effective tax rate is 
defined as current reported tax divided by profit before tax. 
Firms that allow more aggressive policies should exhibit lower 
effective tax rates (ETRs) which are aggressive tax planning 
indicators through permanent book-tax differences [13] [40]. 
The independent variable, female directors, is also measured as 
percentage of women on the board to the total directors 
following [15]. In order to perform the regression analysis, six 
control variables: firm size (SIZE), financial performance 
(ROA), capital intensity (CINT), and leverage (LEV); 
independent board (INDB) and board size (BSIZE) are used 
that are previously linked to tax aggressiveness. This ensures 
that firm characteristics and governance mechanisms do not 
drive the results of the study.  
The economic and political power advantage of larger firms 
relative to small companies makes them more prone to tax 
aggressiveness [25]. SIZE is measured as the natural logarithm 
of firms’ total assets. Financial performance based on the 
Return on assets (ROA) is defined as the ratio of profit before 
tax income to total assets which should lead to an increase in 
ETRs [2] [31]. Tax aggressive actions may be lower in highly 
leveraged firms as they sustain tax deductible interest 
payments. Leverage is measured as total liabilities divided by 
total assets. CINT is the ratio of property, plant and equipment 
to the total assets [31] as long term capital investments may 
produce lower ETRs. Prior evidence mostly indicates that as 
the strength of governance mechanisms increases, managerial 
opportunism decreases to reduce tax aggressive behavior [42]. 
Similar to [35], the percentage of independent outside directors 
on the board as well as the total board number measure board 
independence and board size respectively. 
To examine the association between the female directors 
and tax aggressiveness, a fixed effect panel regression model 
was used in order to perform an analysis regarding various 
parameters included in our model. Therefore, similar to [4] 
[25], the following regression model was estimated: 
𝐸𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 = ∝0 + β1𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑖𝑡 + β2𝐵SIZE𝑖𝑡 + β3INDEP𝑖𝑡+ β4𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 
β5LEV𝑖𝑡 + β6𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖𝑡 + β7CINT𝑖𝑡 + µ𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                  (1) 
VI. RESULTS 
This section presents the descriptive and inferential results 
obtained from the study and findings from the results are 
discussed on the basis of the literature. 
Table I presents the descriptive statistics of the explanatory 
and dependent variables in the sample firms. The mean and 
standard deviation of effective tax rate is 0.1210 (12.10%) and 
0.8688 showing that the effective tax rate of the sample is 
under the statutory tax rate of 30%. It can be implied from the 
low average effective tax rate that Nigerian banks are tax 
aggressive and the nature of payment of taxes fail to signify the 
statutory tax rates displayed by the government. The average 
proportion of female directors is 18.7% which signals for 
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higher participation of women on bank boards in Nigeria. The 
highest number of board members that were women is 4 while 
some boards did not have women presence.  
As regards the corporate governance variables, the average 
board size is 15 and does not surpass the stipulated 20 
members and on average, independent directors ratio is 15.44% 
of board members. This low value shows the need for more 
directors without direct or indirect financial interest on 
corporate boards. With the minimum number of 0, some board 
failed to include independent directors while others had as 
many as 4. However, the mean of firm size, leverage, ROA and 
capital intensity was 21.02, 0.8166, 0.0242 and 0.2783 
respectively. 
TABLE I: Descriptive Statistics 
 N Min Max Mean Std.  
Dev. 
ETR 33 0.0099 0.493 0.1210 0.0869 
FD 33 0.00 0.333 0.1869 0.0829 
BIZE 33 10 19 14.82 2.443 
BIND 33 0.00 0.4 0.1544 0.0853 
SIZE 33 19 22 21.02 0.753 
LEV 33 0.0035 0.9196 0.8166 0.2112 
ROA 33 0.0039 0.0618 0.0242 0.0142 
CINT 33 0.0001 0.0438 0.02 0.01 
 
Table II provides a correlation matrix of the variables. The 
proportion of female director reveals a positive relationship 
with effective tax rate. The same was observed for board size, 
firm size, leverage and capital intensity whereas board 
independence, and Return on assets (ROA) showed opposite 
relation to ETR in respect of the control variables. However, 
only capital intensity was significant to ETR. 
The analysis also provide evidence that female directors is 
positively correlated to firm size, implying that higher 
proportion of women is more likely to belong to larger firms. 
Furthermore, the significant positive relation with leverage 
indicates that the higher the leverage, the higher proportion of 
women on boards. The positive significant relation also 
denotes that larger boards which tend to fit in with larger firms 
may lead to higher number of female board members. This 
implies that firms that are larger in size are more likely to open 
more opportunities to improve board gender diversity. The 
intensity of long term investment in property and equipment is 
related positively to women on boards. This significant 
evidence suggest that capital intensive banks are prone to 
possess women as board members; a significant negative 
relationship also exists for independent boards and ratio of 
female directors suggesting that more board independence 
leads to significantly lower women board appointment. 
However, in terms of performance, the table II reveals that 
the proportion of female directors has no significant 
relationship with ROA. In addition, the correlation coefficient 
of 0.768 between firm size and leverage carries the highest 
value. This implies that larger banks are likely to hold higher 
form of leverage.  
TABLE II: Correlation matrix 
 ETR FD BSIZ
E 




ETR 1        
FD 0.29
9 
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**Significant at 1% level and *Significant at 5% level 
 
From the regression (1) in table III, the adjusted R square of 
0.154 indicates that the independent variables explain 15.40% 
of the changes in the ETR. The positive sign of the coefficient 
of the female directors implies that the increase in the 
percentage of women seating on the board increases the ETR. 
Even though at 5% level of significance, the coefficient was 
not significant, the hypothesis of the study is accepted. This is 
similar to the results of [3] [44] for low female presence on 
boards which provide evidence of no significant effect on tax 
management. The significant coefficient of the control variable, 
board independence relates to the opinion that the presence of 
independent directors can mitigate tax aggressive positions of 
managers. Similar to [30], the inclusion of a higher proportion 
of board independence reduces the likelihood of tax 
aggressiveness. Meanwhile, the studies of [39][35]showed 
evidence of increased tax planning activities. 
However, the study found no significant evidence for the 
rest of the other control variables. The negative sign for the 
board size coefficient is not significant to suggest that a larger 
board size would cause an increase in tax aggressiveness. 
Finally, the regression coefficients for LEV, FSIZE, ROA and 
CINT were found to be insignificant. These results are contrary 
to [32] [35] [38] [44]. As the firm size is also not significant, 
this indicates that tax aggressive behaviour is not limited as 
regards to the size of bank operations and smaller banks may 
even be more tax aggressive than larger banks. 
In regression (2), the moderating effect of board size was 
based on the relationship between female directors and ETR. 
Including the variable, FD * BS, greatly improved the 
explanatory power of the model as the adjusted R2 increased to 
30.8%. The FD variable coefficient carried a negative value 
while the moderating term bears a positive sign, both 
significant at 10% level. Therefore, the ratio of female directors 
significantly affects tax aggressiveness when they are 
occupying positions on large boards.  It can be implied that if 
women are part of large boards, they are likely to be larger in 
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size which allows the risk avoidance behaviour of women to be 
significantly felt on the board decisions. 
TABLE III: Regression results 
Variable
s  
                   (1)     (2) 
β F-stat Sig. Β F-stat  Sig. 
FD 0.154 0.076 0.787 -7.191 3.658 0.08* 
FD * BS    0.478 3.886 0.07* 
BSIZE -0.020 0.495 0.494 -0.102 4.361 0.05** 
INDB 0.944 1.312 0.048*
* 
1.831 4.422 0.05** 
FSIZE 0.070 0.053 0.821 0.511 2.095 0.173 
LEV -0.711 0.759 0.399 -1.713 3.651 0.08* 
ROA -5.290 0.954 0.346 -3.166 0.398 0.540 
CINT 11.826 1.766 0.207 24.113 5.608 0.03** 
Intercept -1.002 0.021 0.871 -9.119 1.74 0.207 
R2              0.656 
             






 * and ** significant at 10% and 5% respectively 
 
VII. DISCUSSION 
This study considers the effect of female directors on 
corporate tax aggressiveness on a sample of 11 listed banks 
over the period of 2012 -2014. Employing a panel regression 
analysis, the higher proportion of female directors does not 
significantly reduce the possibility of tax aggressiveness. 
Female directors on bank boards are noted to be positively 
correlated to effective tax rate, thus, higher ratio of women as 
directors should lead to lower tax aggressiveness as ETR 
increases. This study found that the women presence in board 
of directors has a negative but insignificant effect on 
managerial tax aggressiveness in banks.  
On the basis of the study findings, the percentage of women 
sitting on corporate boards is negligible in comparison to the 
men. This inadequacy of female directors stems from the 
under-representation and insufficiency of professional women 
in senior and key management positions [4]. Therefore, this 
may boil down to the reason for women directors to be 
insignificant in minimising tax aggressive behaviour. As a 
result of this, the proportion of female sitting on board may be 
insignificant to cause an adequate influence on the board tax 
policies. It has been observed that women may be placed on the 
board as “tokens” to channel no real value to the board. As 
tokens, firms may just slightly improve gender diversity of the 
board to satisfy increased support for boardroom diversity. In 
line with this, a pool of at least three female directors is viewed 
to be able to influence corporate outcomes to constitute a 
‘critical mass’ [29] [45]. 
Moreover, the size of the board has a positive moderating 
effect on the tax aggressiveness of female occupied boards 
within the banking industry. It can be implied that better 
governance structure goes favourably with increased board 
gender diversity; given this, further increase in female directors 
should be accompanied with adequate governance means 
required to function at an efficient capacity. 
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS  
In light of the above findings, banks should strongly apply 
the policy encouraging or otherwise mandating women as 
board members to take advantage of their expected benefits. 
This can be more beneficial when a sufficient pool of qualified 
women is available to occupy these positions. This indicates 
the urgent need for gender equality in accessing education and 
learning opportunities. Relating to societal influence, the 
female gender across all age groups has to be encouraged to 
pursue their work goals and not be constrained by traditional 
values and customs. Regarding Nigerian policy, the study 
recommends that the gender and equal opportunities bill should 
be re-introduced, accepted and become legally binding across 
the nation. 
This research opens an avenue in an emerging research area 
for future studies to examine gender effect on other sectors or 
the entire firms listed on the stock exchange. This may be 
women board members, executives and those in top 
management. In addition, other measures of diversity can be 
taken together with gender diversity to study tax aggressive 
behaviour. The study suggests that empirical evidence on the 
determinants of tax planning activities among Nigerian banks 
and other firms is obtained.    
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